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Paper Fish and Policy Conflict: Catch Shares and Ecosystem-Based
Management in Maine’s Groundfishery
Jennifer F. Brewer 1

ABSTRACT. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration professes support for ecosystembased fisheries management, as mandated by Congress in the Fishery Conservation and Management Act,
and as endorsed by the Obama Administration’s national ocean policy. Nonetheless, driving agency policies,
including catch shares and fishing quotas, focus principally on individual species, diverting attention from
ecosystem considerations such as habitat, migratory patterns, trophic relationships, fishing gear, and firmlevel decision making. Environmental non-governmental organization (ENGO) agendas manifest similar
inconsistencies. A case study of Maine’s groundfishery demonstrates implications of this policy conflict
at the local level. There, multigenerational fishing villages have historically pursued diversified and adaptive
livelihood strategies, supported by local ecological knowledge. This tradition is increasingly eroded by
regulatory constraints, including catch shares. Field observation, interviews, survey data, and archival
review reveal that industry-supported, ecosystem-focused proposals have been rejected by the New England
Fishery Management Council, despite the apparent failure of single-species approaches to sustain fish
populations, fished ecosystems, and fishing-dependent communities. The creation of groundfishery catch
share sectors is likely to perpetuate industry consolidation and political entrenchment under more mobile
capital, following precedent set by days-at-sea, and making area protections and gear restrictions less likely.
Pending marine spatial planning efforts could enhance social–ecological resilience by creating new
opportunities for transdisciplinary decision support, and broader public participation and accountability.
Key Words: catch shares; ecosystem-based management; fisheries; Fishery Management Council;
groundfish; ITQs; Maine; New England; NOAA; quotas

INTRODUCTION
On 19 July 2010, President Obama signed a National
Ocean Policy executive order endorsing findings of
the Administration’s Interagency Ocean Policy
Task Force, including “ecosystem-based” and
“adaptive” marine resource management (Interagency
Ocean Policy Task Force 2009). Meanwhile, the
National Marine Fisheries Service of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
was finalizing a national policy encouraging the use
of fishery catch shares. Catch shares include limited
access privileges, individual fishing quotas (ITQs),
and quotas held by groups such as harvest
cooperatives or fleet sectors (NOAA 2009). Both
policies were informed by years of environmental
non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) lobbying
of NOAA and the White House Council on
Environmental Quality, by Congressional mandates
1
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embedded in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (FCMA)—
particularly its amendments in 1996 and 2006—and
by reports from bodies such as the National
Academy of Sciences, U.S. Oceans Commission,
and Pew Oceans Commission (National Research
Council 1999, 2006, Pew Oceans Commission
2003, U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 2004,
Joint Oceans Commission Initiative 2009). Despite
this breadth of input, public discussion appears not
to consider the possibility that ecosystem-based
management and catch shares are at odds:
historically intertwined, but conceptually divergent.
Although policy conflict is nothing new, this
particular divergence provides entrée to more
empirically robust conversations about the future of
marine resource management. Evidence from the
nation’s oldest commercial fishery, the New
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England groundfishery (which includes bottomdwelling species, such as cod (Gadus morhua),
haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), winter
flounder (Pleuronectes americanus), dabs
(Hippoglossoides platessoides), grey sole (Glyptocephalus
cynoglossus), pollock (Pollachius virens), whiting
(Merluccius bilinearis), red hake (Urophycis
chuss), and redfish (Sebastes fasciatus)) and,
especially, case material from the state of Maine
suggest that catch shares may deter the development
of ecosystem-based management. Catch shares shift
the attention of managers, fishermen, and the public
away from integrated understandings of fished
ecosystems and fishing practices, and toward paper
fish. The term “paper fish” was coined by fishermen
to refer to federal permits allowing fishing activities
based on single-species stock assessments,
implying that the assessments are detached from the
complexities of real-world fishing practice and
fished ecosystems. (The few fisherwomen in New
England self-identify as “fishermen,” so that term
is used here.)
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
now boasts 14 catch share programs in the United
States. Although some fishermen have implemented
catch shares with relative enthusiasm, others are
deeply concerned about long-term social–
ecological damage. Public comments collected by
NOAA in 2010 and summarized in Appendix 1
revealed a strong opposition to catch shares among
both commercial and recreational fishermen,
reaching 83% and 90% respectively. Maine’s
fishing communities have long been among the
most resistant to catch shares. Opposition grows
principally from socioeconomic considerations,
specifically the concern that catch shares
consolidate fishery access and decision making in
the hands of fewer, larger, and less locally
committed firms, but it also reflects concerns about
ecosystem impacts. Similar objections are raised by
fishermen in other locales, but often with less
unanimity.
Pursuant to this argument, this paper briefly
summarizes scholarship on ecosystem- and catch
share-based fisheries policy in the U.S. context,
presents the groundfish case study and discusses its
implications, and concludes with a glance toward
possible futures.

Ecosystem-Based Management
Ecosystem-oriented decision support for resource
management originates at least as early as the 1930s
and 1940s when biologists began advocating the
protection of biodiversity and ecosystem services
using politically adaptive strategies (Grumbine
1994, Scheiber 1997). Despite profound differences
in conceptual and normative orientation, this history
runs parallel to the evolution of fisheries yield
models, which originated earlier in the 20th century,
and flourished in the 1930s through 1970s (Larkin
1977). Yield models grew out of agricultural and
industrial production models developed to
maximize economic output–input ratios, paired
with increasing biological knowledge about species
population dynamics, and more-or-less nuanced
conceptions of carrying capacity (Baranov 1918,
Ricker 1948, Schaefer 1954, Beverton and Holt
1957).
Although principles of ecosystem management
gained traction more rapidly in government
agencies responsible for terrestrial resources, such
as forests and wildlife, 1996 and 2006
reauthorizations of the FCMA include language
intended to advance a more ecosystemic orientation
in fisheries policy (McLeod and Leslie 2009). In the
last decade, a veritable cottage industry of papers,
reports, and special journal issues has produced
proposals for more ecosystem-based fisheries
management (Ecological Society of America 1998,
Ecosystem Principles Advisory Panel 1999, Link
2002, United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization 2002, Pikitch et al. 2004, Browman
and Stergiou 2005, Cury and Christensen 2005,
McLeod et al. 2005, National Research Council
2006, Murawski 2007, Varjopuro et al. 2008,
Rosenberg 2009, Tallis et al. 2010).
Central principles found in many of these
frameworks include:
1. Future provision of ecosystem goods and
services.
2. Adaptability and resilience to accommodate
change and surprise in complex systems.
3. Interconnectedness of human and environmental
variables.
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4. Broad social learning despite uncertainties.
5. Place-based understanding of cumulative
impacts and cross-scalar interactions.
6. Public accountability for management tradeoffs (Ecological Society of America 1998,
Ecosystem Principles Advisory Panel 1999,
United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization 2002, Tallis et al. 2010).
Although some fisheries scholars and managers
question the feasibility of ecosystem-based
management, especially given current legal
constraints and limited financial, human, and
information resources, few object substantively to
its core mission. Biologists employed or funded by
NOAA are developing multi-species population
models, and ENGOs have embraced at least the
ecosystem-oriented phraseology, especially to
support broader and more precautionary regulatory
attention to species and habitat.
Share-Based Management
Share-based fishery management renames a policy
trend pursued more or less actively in the United
States since the 1980s, borrowing from Canadian
experiences of the 1970s (National Research
Council 1999). Finding that reductions in the issue
of fishing permits were insufficient to prevent fish
population declines, some economists advocated
quota allocations of harvestable species to
individual firms, often arguing that market
transferability would create a conservation
incentive because future quota values would rise
with the availability of future fish populations
(Christy 1973, Rettig and Ginter 1978, Copes 1979).
These discussions were directly informed by older
debates in economic theory between preferences for
public or private stewardship of fisheries and other
natural resources (Gordon 1953, Scott 1955).
Advocates for individual quotas argue that the
mechanism distributes fishing effort more evenly
across time, thereby increasing prices and safety,
reducing fleet overcapitalization, and potentially
increasing conservation incentives by creating a
market to internalize at least species-specific
externalities (National Research Council 1999).
Much empirical evidence on catch shares is
inconclusive or depicts mixed outcomes. A study of
121 individual quota fisheries and 11,014 non-quota

fisheries found that individual quotas reduce or
reverse rates of fishery decline (Costello et al. 2008).
The study estimated fishery status by comparing
historical harvest levels, however, not living fish
populations or other ecosystem variables, and did
not control for differences among fisheries or
management mechanisms that might be implemented
simultaneously with quotas. Even examining the
single case of British Columbia halibut ITQs, two
recent papers found evidence supporting rather
different arguments. One found that market
distortions around capital and information access
necessary for quota leasing undermine broad
distribution of public goods (Pinkerton and Edwards
2009). Another argued that ITQs nonetheless
increase halibut landings and overall income (Turris
2010). Although these findings are not incongruent,
they remind us that different truths become more
and less salient at different scales of analysis, and
that policy decisions require difficult trade-offs
among competing social priorities. Given evidence
of social–ecological externalities in the groundfish
case, it may be that quotas are better for target fish
populations and capital investors than for social–
ecological diversity, or collateral ecosystem goods
and services.
In the U.S., ITQs were created for Atlantic surf
clams and quahogs in 1990, for South Atlantic
wreckfish in 1992, and for Alaska halibut and
sablefish in 1995 following more protracted public
debate. Shortly thereafter, the 1996 FCMA
amendment encouraging ecosystem approaches to
management also imposed a moratorium on ITQs
and commissioned a National Academy of Sciences
study, responding to concerns about privatization
of public trust resources voiced by both less
capitalized fishing firms and ENGOs. The Academy
study underscored social and ecological concerns
about ITQs, but recommended that they be
permitted with provisions for detailed oversight and
review (National Research Council 1999). Major
national ENGOs largely opposed, expressed
concern about, or were neutral on ITQs through the
mid 2000s, and some lobbied for close federal
oversight in FCMA 2006 reauthorization (Marine
Fish Conservation Network 2007). The Environmental
Defense Fund, however, has long advocated
individual transferable fishing quotas with few
restrictions on transferability, true to its belief in the
ability of private property rights to resolve
environmental problems (Environmental Defense
Fund 1994).
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In 2004, the Bush Administration announced
support for “dedicated access privileges,” meant to
encompass individual and group quotas (Office of
the President 2004). Reauthorization of the FCMA
in 2006 subsequently lifted the ITQ moratorium,
and replaced it with industry referendum
requirements only for any New England ITQ
proposal. In 2008, Environmental Defense’s Board
Vice Chair was appointed as NOAA’s top
administrator, and in 2009, a Pew report expressed
support for catch shares (Pew Environment Group
2009). Subsequently, the Obama Administration
endorsed ITQs along with less market-driven quota
systems, and devoted NOAA resources to
implementation (Catch Shares Working Group
2008, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration 2009). By summer of 2009, when
public comment was submitted on a transformative
sector quota proposal in New England’s
groundfishery, pivotal marine ENGOs including the
Ocean Conservancy, Conservation Law Foundation,
Environmental Defense, and Pew Environment
Group endorsed catch shares and facilitated the
electronic submission of 9245 form letters from
their supporters across the country. Close affiliate
Oceana supported catch shares in principle, but
feared that New England sectors might be held up
by legal challenges because they sidestepped
industry referendums. By this time, Environmental
Defense had hired fishing community organizers to
promote catch shares from coast to coast.
Individual transferable fishing quotas and related
catch share programs have raised objections from
many social scientists and small-boat fishing
groups, reflecting arguments that:
1. Quota supporters overestimate conservation
incentives because they overlook the
significance of informal social norms,
bounded rationality, and regulatory noncompliance.
2. Because quotas are usually transferable,
legally or illegally, industry consolidation is
virtually inevitable, so that less capitalized
firms and more remote fishing harbors lose
fishery access or become harvesting
contractors to vertically integrated firms.
3. Quotas are usually allocated based on past
fishery participation, granting windfall
profits to firms with the highest landings.

4. Quotas do not sufficiently internalize habitat
and cross-species externalities.
5. Conservation success of quotas requires that
the total fishery-wide allowable catch limit is
set appropriately.
6. Many quota programs lack transparency and
public accountability, partly because advocates
employ neoclassical economic theory to
espouse quota shareholders’ capacity for selfgovernance.
7. Quotas become capitalized, politically
entrenched, and difficult to rescind, even with
codified review or sunset provisions.
8. Market distortions, rent-seeking, information
asymmetries, and path dependencies arise
(Copes 1986, Davis 1996, Rieser 1997,
National Research Council 1999, Criddle and
Macinko 2000, McCay 2004, Degnbol et al.
2006, Bromley 2009, Pinkerton and Edwards
2009).
These authors cite more than two decades of
accumulated evidence critiquing neoclassical
economic theory through empirical studies of
common property resource management institutions,
especially informal social relations not codified in
law (National Research Council 2002, Dolšak and
Ostrom 2003, Berkes 2008, Hanna 2008, RamirezSanchez and Pinkerton 2009). A few further
question the undergirding concepts of total
allowable catch and maximum sustainable yield
upon which catch shares are predicated, arguing that
without more precautionary or ecosystemcognizant implementation, these aggregate targets
can prioritize management attention to singlespecies populations and thereby discourage
consideration of habitat and cross-species variables
(Larkin 1977, Wilson et al. 1996, Walters et al.
2005, Finley 2009). More recently, at least one
author has suggested that catch shares might
discourage ecosystem stewardship (Gibbs 2009,
2010). Although this argument is not new to some
long-time fishery participants and observers, it is
not yet established in the scholarly literature and
merits further empirical support as provided in the
case study below.
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METHODS
This study uses a modified grounded theory
methodology (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Strauss and
Corbin 1990, Glaser 1994). Grounded theory is not
social theory per se, but methodological practice,
standard among social scientists relying mainly on
qualitative data sets. It iterates phases of data
collection and textual and discourse analysis, often
producing a series of nested sampling frames, and
a multi-level explanatory framework. This includes
first-order analyses with the greatest internal
validity, often of more prospective use to local field
professionals than to theoretical interpretation, and
higher-order analyses with greater external validity
and conceptual relevance. Analysis is premised on
constant comparison, or the trained researcher’s
persistent and rigorous comparison of new data with
an emerging conceptual framework, including the
production of extensive field notes and memos.
Although less transparent than quantitative
methods, this qualitative approach can answer
research questions for which quantitative methods
may be inadequate or impractical. Unlike public
opinion polling, for example, discourse analysis
allows subtle contextual cues to compensate for the
reality that individuals simultaneously hold varied
and inconsistent opinions, and that the relative
weighting of these within a single individual’s
rationality and corresponding behavioral and
rhetorical choices fluctuates and evolves over time
(Haraway 1988, Sen 2009). In a utopian world, with
unlimited public venues in which to clarify values,
exchange information, and compare conflicting
viewpoints, individual and collective rationalities
would be easier to fix and quantify. The reality of
marine resource policy, like most human arenas, is
much less tidy.
The case material presented here was developed
through synthesis of existing scholarship; archival
review of government documents, news media,
fishing industry and ENGO publications, and local
histories; and common social science field data
collection techniques. It synthesizes research from
several smaller projects conducted between 1998
and 2010, primarily in Maine, but also in
Washington, D.C., elsewhere in New England, the
southeastern U.S., Alaska, and abroad. I conducted
extended in-person interviews ranging from a halfhour to several hours in length, included formal and
informal conversations with more than 165 fishing
industry members, public servants, NGO staff,
scientists, and other coastal residents and

professionals. Of these, the vast majority were
purposively sampled. That is, I selected them
individually to represent particular groups or
viewpoints. In particular, I chose fishing industry
members to represent a range of business models,
target species, gear types, career histories, and home
harbors, as summarized in Appendix 2. I conducted
shorter, informal, substantively research-related
conversations with at least another 200 members of
the same groups. I also collected 49 mail survey
responses from three randomized samples of state
license holders for commercial marine harvesting
and commercial lobster fishing. These solicited
information about personal fishing histories,
opinions on selected management issues, and
perceptions of industry participation in management.
Research assistants conducted telephone interviews
with a stratified random sample of 36 Maine-based
federal groundfish permit holders and crew
members. These focused again on personal fishing
histories, especially as these were affected by
groundfish management. I convened four focus
groups in eastern Maine on local experiences of
fishery management impacts. I undertook
participant observation at more than 40 public
meetings and more than 35 non-public policy
briefings, conferences, and project meetings in New
England, Washington, D.C., North Carolina, and
Alaska; and in fishing households, on fishing
vessels, on piers, and on other fishing-related
premises. Some participant observation took place
as dedicated scientific investigation, some during 4
years of experience as a policy and resource
management professional in federal and state
government and non-profit organizations.
CASE STUDY RESULTS
Maine’s Historically Adaptive Fleet
Whereas virtually all fishermen consider
atmospheric, oceanographic, and inter-species
phenomena on annual and interannual scales, smallboat, diversified, multi-generational owneroperators often have fewer financial and
technological buffers between their business plans
and ecosystem change and may accumulate a richer
store of ecosystem knowledge, at least on a local
scale. Maine retains more firms of this type than do
most U.S. states. Reviewing the historical evolution
of the industry helps clarify its legacy of ecosystembased thinking. The first centuries of this history are
not unlike those experienced by other fishing states
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on the eastern seaboard. In the last century, however,
the easternmost state’s relative distance from urban
markets facilitated the continued passage of local
ecological observations from one generation to the
next.
Although England colonized the Maine coast in the
early 1600s with the immediate intent of exporting
dried codfish to Europe, when domestic markets
grew in the 19th century they also diversified, first
to include mackerel, halibut, haddock, pollock and
hake, then soft-shelled clams, herring, lobsters,
crabs, scallops, salmon, shad, alewives, smelt,
striped bass, eels, sturgeon, and porgies (Vickers
1994, Lipfert et al. 1995, O’Leary 1996, Lear 1998).
In the 20th century, new markets emerged for
species such as flounder, whiting, redfish, tuna,
shrimp, mussels, quahogs, urchins, periwinkles,
dogfish, skates, and sea cucumbers. Fishing gear
historically included dip nets, hand rakes, hand
lines, gill nets, weirs or beach seines, fyke nets, pots
and traps, stop seines, and spears. Tub trawls, or
setlines, came into use in the second half of the 19th
century in Maine, using longer rope coiled in tubs
with many more hooks to catch groundfish, but as
late as 1930, some boats were still using hand lines
(Lear 1998). Small-boat diversified fishermen still
use tub trawls for halibut, although in the 1970s most
shifted to wire longlines, which are more stable on
bottom. Net trawls of sorts were used in New
England in the 19th century, and in the 1930s, some
Mainers adopted the otter trawl, which is a bagshaped net kept open to catch more fish with each
tow by heavy wooden or metal doors mounted along
the lines between the net and boat. Although it
required a more powerful boat engine, it enabled
year-round groundfishing because most groundfish
will not take baited hooks during summer months
when they prey on migratory herring schools.
Maine’s fishing fleet has long been dominated by
boats smaller than 12 m in length, except for a few
decades of capital investment and ownership
concentration in the second half of the 19th century.
Concentrated investment ended with the innovation
of refrigerated rail cars to travel more southerly
routes, market promotions by the emerging
meatpacking industry, changing urban tastes, and
cheap Canadian salt cod. Small Maine boats with
local crews have historically ventured to grounds as
distant as the Grand Banks, Gulf of St. Lawrence,
and shores of Newfoundland and Labrador

(O’Leary 1996), but most have always preferred to
fish close to home for reasons of comfort and safety.
Few individuals in the state have ever owned more
than one fishing vessel at a time, most owners
captain their own boats for the majority of their
career, and in the past, crew and shareholders were
mainly close kin (O’Leary 1996). With future
fishing access now less certain due to both
population declines and regulatory constraints,
kinship remains a powerful factor in industry
relationships, but is supplemented with a somewhat
broader array of social ties (Brewer 2010). In the
last two decades, regulatory trends outlined below
have favored larger, more mobile boats.
Until the late 20th century when entry limits were
implemented, first in federally managed fisheries
and then in state-managed fisheries, the vast
majority of Maine fishermen targeted a number of
marine species in seasonal livelihood strategies
reliant on fishing and non-fishing incomes, barter
arrangements, and subsistence (Brewer 2010). As
one fisherman said in 2003, referring to his
experience fishing for lobster, herring, shrimp,
groundfish, and scallops, “[M]y way of fishing, for
30 years, is I’ve done a little of everything to survive.
And if you look at Maine, that’s what we did for
three or four hundred years. If it wasn’t herring, it
was groundfish... And the further down east you go,
the more they depended upon diversity to survive,
not just lobstering” (field interview, 27 August
2003, Casco Bay, Maine).
Typical non-fishing activities included fishing gear
construction and repair, smallholder forestry and
woodcutting, hunting, building trades, woodworking,
boatbuilding, gardening, handicrafts, and services
for summer residents and visitors. As in many other
small-boat diversified fleets, fishing pressure was
flexible, varying annually and interannually with
species populations, markets, weather, and local
availability of labor, capital, and information
(Wilson 1982, Acheson 1988, Griffith 1999, Brewer
2010). New fishery participants were limited at the
local harbor level through informal social sanctions,
with consideration of social–ecological factors
(Acheson 1988, Wilson 1990, Brewer 2010).
Today, however, the overwhelming majority of
Maine’s more than 6000 commercial fishermen rely
primarily on lobster, partly because catch shares and
fish population declines pushed them out of
groundfish and other fisheries.
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The Evolution of Catch Shares and
Alternatives
In the 1960s, Maine and New England witnessed
large fleets of factory-scale trawlers from Europe
and Asia fishing within sight of land. Congress
responded in 1976 by creating the U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone, expelling foreign vessels, offering
loans and savings programs for new and bigger
domestic boats, and creating eight Regional Fishery
Management Councils. Council members have
comprised mostly fishermen and state managers,
originally tasked to advise NOAA on how to build
up and regulate the U.S. fleet. Various share-based
regulations have been imposed since, often with
mixed results, as described below and summarized
in Fig. 1.
Fleet Quotas
Fleet quotas were the first experiment in groundfish
catch shares, and a disastrous one. In 1977, NOAA
set a preliminary total allowable catch for New
England groundfish, triggering a fishing derby
among firms fearing a fishery shutdown, and
causing prices to collapse. Some boats landed fish
in small harbors where they could avoid reporting.
Others caught or falsely reported harvests from
Canadian waters, which fell under a separate quota
(Hennessey and Healey 2000). Attempts to allocate
fleet quotas by vessel size, and by quarter year,
failed to prevent derbies and non-compliance
(Murawski et al. 1997, Groundfish Task Force
2004). Larger boats that previously fished offshore
started fishing closer in because quotas could be
achieved more rapidly with less travel time
(Hennessey and Healey 2000). When fleet quotas
were discontinued in the early 1980s, fishermen
were already noticing nearshore groundfish
depletions. As one lifelong Casco Bay fishermen
said in 2003, “[W]e found that the fish were just
getting farther and farther offshore. I was used to
making a good living within 20 or 30 miles of the
coast. But then we got off to 70. And more nets,
more nets. When I first started we had 24 nets and
when I ended we had like 46” (field interview, 27
August 2003, Casco Bay, Maine).

participant observation data document that, in some
places, at some times, experienced captains can
avoid non-target groundfish species, but at other
times, in other places, they find themselves with
large hauls they are forbidden to land. When forced
to dump already-dead fish, forbidden even from
donating them to the needy, they typically respond
with intial feelings of horror, outrage, disgust, and
eventually helplessness and disillusionment at the
failure of management to prevent ecological tragedy
as well as financial loss. Expression of such
sentiments by Gulf of Maine fishermen has been
well documented by Council staff (New England
Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) and
National Marine Fisheries Service 2003). As one
persistently conservation-minded Council member
and fisherman argued prior to a trip limit vote, “I
would say this Council better do some soul
searching and better do it real quickly...[T]hrowing
everything over the side solves nothing. Quite
frankly I think it’s a disgrace. I think we should have
never done it in any stock. I’ve been opposed to it
from day one” (field audio recording and notes, 23
June 2010, Portland, Maine, NEFMC meeting). The
imposition of trip limits for cod, haddock, and other
species resulted in undocumented reports of up to
8000 pounds of cod discards per boat per day, but
was repeated at least six times through 2010 as the
New England Council struggled to comply with
NOAA’s total annual catch targets (Hennessey and
Healey 2000, NOAA 2001, Groundfish Task Force
2004).
Gear Restrictions
Fishing gear restrictions represent a non-catch share
management alternative, one that has been used in
the groundfishery, but not as much as it could be.
Minimum net mesh sizes were established in 1953
and have been increased many times since (NOAA
2004). Extended field observation, interviews, and
archival review show that a small but increasing
number of fishermen have repeatedly proposed
additional gear restrictions such as:
1. Reducing numbers of gillnets allowed per
boat.

Trip Quotas

2. Increasing gillnet mesh sizes to increase
survival rates of smaller fish.

Along with fleet quotas came trip quotas. Starting
in 1977, daily and weekly trip limits were set for
cod, triggering regulatory discards. Interview and

3. Increasing the frequency of gillnet tending
and reducing bycatch mortality.
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Fig. 1. Timeline of key national policy and regional management events in the New England
groundfishery since federalization.

4. Increasing trawl net mesh sizes to increase
survival rates of smaller fish.
5. Incentivizing hook fishing to reduce benthic
impacts and low selectivity by otter trawls,
and non-target species bycatch in gillnets.
6. Installing panels of trawl net mesh on the
square instead of the diamond, to keep net
openings larger while being dragged through
the water so more fish can escape, especially
round-bodied species like cod.

7. Limiting the size of rubber rollers on otter
trawls, to deter dragging on rough bottom,
which is preferred habitat for some
groundfish species.
8. Limiting the length of otter trawl ground
cables, to reduce mud clouds that induce fish
to move toward the net.
9. Banning nighttime otter trawling, to prevent
capture of cod when they aggregate on bottom
to spawn, and to reduce gear conflicts with
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lobster traps (Northwest Atlantic Marine
Alliance 2002, Area Management Coalition
2006).
In the 1980s, few fishermen were willing to support
such proposals, as they were unwilling to support
most management proposals in general. As the
fishery has declined, however, and as NOAA has
increasingly promoted catch share options, more
fishermen agree that gear restrictions would be
better than catch shares, for fished populations, for
habitat and non-target species, and for the long-term
sustainability of fishing-dependent businesses and
communities. The Council rejected all but the first
two of the gear restrictions above, however. In the
case of roller sizes, cable length limits, and
nighttime trawl bans, Council staff indicated that
credit could not be granted toward the achievement
of total catch targets, because of insufficient data to
project corresponding effort reductions (email
comm., 12 August 2010, southern Maine).
Away from public scrutiny and regulatory
posturing, increasing numbers of non-otter-trawl
fishermen, including some former otter trawlers,
privately support proposals to restrict otter trawling,
citing impacts on benthic habitat and non-target
species. The vast majority of Maine fishermen
fervently advocate bans on midwater trawls, which
are used to harvest herring, again citing (1) bycatch
of groundfish and other species because the nonselective nets use small mesh and harvest large
volumes in short time periods, (2) the ability of
trawls to harvest entire aggregations of densely
schooled fish, whereas seines can only remove
smaller and less densely schooled volumes, and (3)
benthic impacts because the gear can sometimes fish
on bottom. In a non-random sample of dozens of
industry members over several years, the level of
this industry sentiment surpassed 99%, including
even Maine-based midwater trawler crew (pers.
comm., 2003, Damariscotta, Maine).
Area Management
Gear restrictions have long been linked to area
management, both being input restrictions whereas
catch shares are output restrictions. The New
England Council began implementing area closures
in 1982, first seasonal ones, then permanent
(Murawski et al. 1997, Groundfish Task Force
2004). Many closures have eventually won industry
support because they are recognized to protect

nursery and spawning grounds, migration corridors,
and non-target species (Northwest Atlantic Marine
Alliance 2002, Area Management Coalition 2006).
As a third-generation mid-coast Maine trawl boat
captain wrote, “[G]roundfishing was banned in five
designated areas off New England's shores...[T]here
is no bottom trawling allowed in these areas, and
there shouldn’t be.” (Libby 2010) Some fishermen
assert that closures would be more effective if timed
differently, if increased or decreased in size, or if
opened and closed using real-time observational
data, and a few have proposed additional area
closures. Many fishermen, including a few otter
trawlers, privately support proposals to restrict otter
trawls from additional near-shore waters, especially
known spawning areas. One second-generation
trawl boat owner–operator admitted, “[P]rotection
of [spawning area] sites is paramount to any
successful recovery of our fishery in the long term”
(email comm., 26 September 2005, mid-coast
Maine).
The most persistent industry-originated calls for
area management have been formalized by a Mainecentered network of grassroots organizations
including Penobscot East Resource Center
(Penobscot East), its predecessors and allies the
Northwest Atlantic Marine Alliance and Stonington
Fisheries Alliance, the less active Independent
Fishermen Investing in Sustainable Harvesting, and
the newer and highly active Midcoast Fishermen’s
Association (Northwest Atlantic Marine Alliance
2002, Area Management Coalition 2006). By 2009,
an Area Management Coalition proposal was
supported by all these organizations, collecting
signatures from 25 eastern Maine fishermen and
fishing community members, plus the Ocean
Conservancy and Conservation Law Foundation,
and two fishing community-focused NGOs. It was
verbally supported by dozens more southern Maine
fishermen who attended a series of coalition
meetings in 2005 and 2006. Coalition organizers
estimated the number of industry supporters at 200
in 2006 when the proposal was submitted to the
Council (email comm., 18 August 2010, southern
Maine). Another letter of support had been endorsed
by 84 marine scientists in 2003. Even though the
proposal would have implemented area management
only in the Gulf of Maine, where traction for the
idea seemed high, the Council declined to pursue it.
Such area-focused proposals build on the local
knowledge of groundfishermen who recall placespecific, near-shore, annual cod and haddock
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spawning aggregations that have been fished out
(Ames 1997). Although spawning aggregations also
take place offshore, many industry-recognized
locales are in or near river mouths. Some of the most
experienced and attentive fishermen further observe
differentiated skin colorations between what they
believe to be resident and migratory subpopulations.
This work has informed a developing scientific
consensus that cod and perhaps other groundfish
species may have substock population structures
more complex and place-dependent than presently
accounted for in NOAA population models used to
project management outcomes (Wilson et al. 1999,
Ruzzante et al. 2001, Ames 2004, Brodziak et al.
2008).
Days-at-Sea
Rather than focusing on area management or gear
restrictions, in the last two decades, an unusual and
heavily used management tool in the New England
groundfishery has been days-at-sea. This developed
in the mid 1990s, following a fisherman’s proposal
that each boat report some number of days out of
the fishery. This was intended to partially fulfill new
harvest limits in the wake of a landmark 1991
lawsuit by the Conservation Law Foundation and
Massachusetts Audubon Society citing NOAA’s
failure to prevent overfishing of cod, haddock, and
yellowtail flounder. When the Council instead
elected to count active fishing days instead of nonfishing days, tied fishing days to permits, and placed
a moratorium on new permits, a potentially
transferable property right was created. Although a
day-at-sea is not a catch share per se, because it
represents a fishing input not an output or quota, it
does represent a discrete and individual fishing
opportunity, and manifests many of the same
operational features as an individual fishing quota.
Individual days-at-sea were allocated and
repeatedly reduced based on permit landing
histories in Council-selected years, have become
legally transferable across permits by lease or by
permit sale, and can be aggregated from several
permits onto one boat. Considerable industry
consolidation has taken place as a result. There is
also less transparency of permit ownership and
decision making because more permit holders are
now incorporated, and processors and other nonfishing interests have become more active investors.
Dozens of interviews reveal the perverse incentives
created by days-at-sea. Simultaneous with days-atsea reductions to meet NOAA effort reduction

requirements, firms have learned to use limited
fishing time more efficiently, even at risk to human
life when captains become more reluctant to end a
fishing day early because of gear malfunctions,
weather, or other problems. Because boats must
make the maximum profit possible for every hour
at sea, they broadcast their effort less widely and
focus on proven grounds. This may aggravate the
depletion of localized substocks below recovery
thresholds, and can raise rates of non-target species
discards because captains encountering non-target
species are less willing to spend time steaming
elsewhere. According to one second-generation
groundfish and shrimp trawler, “Personally, I think
that protecting small fish is a high priority. Small
fish live in spawning areas. Under the current rules,
days at sea, a fisherman is almost compelled to catch
as many as he can regardless of size of the fish or if
he is in a spawning area because that clock is ticking.
There is no time to go searching for larger fish
because you are losing precious time” (email comm.
26 September 2005, mid-coast Maine).
Under days-at-sea, larger otter trawlers are again
tempted to fish closer to shore to minimize travel
time, decimating inshore populations. Firms with
several boats have been more able to influence
differential cuts in days-at-sea allocations and rules
for leasing of days because they are more able to
afford lobbyists and travel to Council meetings
whereas owner–operators are fishing. Non-owner
boat captains are less likely to make operating
decisions that would accommodate habitat and nontarget species considerations because their decision
horizons are shorter than if they could count on
fishing the same grounds in a few years or pass the
business on to younger kin or neighbors. As one
lifelong fisherman from southern Maine with
experience both as an owner–operator and hired
captain explained, captains running larger boats
spend less time on deck and are rarely informed of
the crew’s observation of ecological evidence, such
as bottom sediments or corals clinging to gear,
harvested quantities of non-target predator or prey
species, visible indicators of feeding or spawning
behavior at the time of harvest, or even fish size,
sex, weight, or apparent health (pers. comm., 2004,
Washington, D.C.).
Policy Failure
From 1991 until the late 2000s, low cod populations
remained a prevailing driver of groundfish
regulation in the Gulf of Maine, initially coupled
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with low haddock populations. Haddock were
recovering by the early 2000s, and NOAA no longer
believed overfishing to be occurring. Cod followed
suit by 2008, but concern arose about flounder,
especially on Georges Bank, the offshore perimeter
of the Gulf of Maine (NOAA 2008).
In 1994, Maine had 587 federally permitted
groundfish vessels, or 19% of the New England total
of 3033 permits. By 2007, only 71 Maine boats were
somewhat active in groundfishing, comprising 12%
of the New England fleet of 574. By 2009, 24
permits were held in the eastern third of the state,
but only five had any remaining usable days-at-sea.
Because landings were insufficient to support local
buyers, virtually all harvests and sales had shifted
to western Maine. By contrast, further south, a single
firm in New Bedford, Massachusetts held 30 active
permits in 2009. Calculating an average harvest
baseline from 1980s landings, and a conservative
local economic multiplier, losses to eastern Maine
alone have been estimated at $26 million per year
for more than two and a half decades. Even using a
lower 1990s average baseline, those annual losses
still reach $15 million (Penobscot East Resource
Center 2007). In 2007, with the urging of Penobscot
East, Maine’s legislature unanimously passed a
joint resolution urging the Council to adopt
alternatives to days-at-sea that “recogniz[e]...
ecological differences between ocean regions and
species” (123rd Maine State Legislature 2007).
Extensive participant observation and interview
data reveal that fishermen’s keen awareness that
days-at-sea are a poor effort measure, and their
associated moral outrage at the socioeconomic and
ecological impacts of management failure, decrease
industry confidence in the good faith and expertise
of NOAA, and in fishery recovery, thereby
increasing non-compliance with, and public
complaints about, fishery regulation overall.
Sectors
Despite New England’s persistent resistance to
catch shares, the failure of days-at-sea to conserve
fish populations, coupled with funding from NOAA
and several foundations for groups of permit holders
organizing quota-holding “sectors,” made the
deeper entrenchment of catch shares a virtual
inevitability by 2009.
It should be noted that NOAA staff routinely
demonstrate sincere dedication to public service
while enduring criticism from the fishing industry,

ENGOs, elected officials, and academics. Perhaps
with this in mind, as well as bio-economic
arguments noted above, NOAA’s catch share policy
facilitates agency disengagement from fishery
access allocation battles, delegating these to shareholding entities that may ultimately include not only
fishing firms and parent companies, but NGOs. This
move was anticipated by the creation of share-based
sectors, pioneered by a group of Cape Cod hook
fishermen who held days-at-sea and agreed to
accept an aggregate annual quota allocation. This
move garnered them political support from ENGOs,
financial support from private foundations for
administrative and advocacy work, and NOAA
exemptions from daily trip limits, hook maximums,
and area closures.
In 2010, the Council and NOAA granted additional
share allocations to 17 newly self-identifying
sectors. Many permit holders were forced into these
organized groups of fishing firms by pending 32%
cuts to non-sector days-at-sea. Share allocations
were based on landings histories between 1996 and
2006, so that the most aggressive users of days-atsea control the most quota, and small boats plying
depleted inshore waters will own little. Sectors are
not subject to days-at-sea, are exempt from many
area closures, are allowed to roll some overages to
following years, and are thus far allowed to transfer
shares freely, with virtually no caps on maximum
share holdings. Although sectors were never
favored by the vast majority of Maine firms, viable
alternatives are now moot. Several sectors have
already effectively distributed ITQs to their
members, but Penobscot East convinced several
small eastern Maine boats to partner with several
from Martha’s Vinyard, Massachusetts, and
organize cooperative governance mechanisms
whereby socioeconomic and ecological drawbacks
of individual shares might be tempered by smallscale, local, hook gear allocations, and continuing
efforts to achieve spawning area closures.
Despite any best intentions, sector-level decision
making is less transparent than Council and NOAA
processes, avoiding public notification, comment,
and other provisions of the National Environmental
Policy and Administrative Procedures Acts.
Although full environmental impact statements,
informed by public hearings, are prepared for many
Council-level decisions, thus far sectors are only
required to prepare environmental assessments,
which are shorter and have no public hearing
requirement. Other than Environmental Defense,
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which holds a Council seat, ENGOs that once
regularly sent staff to New England Council
meetings rarely do so now. Thus far, sectors have
also circumvented the 2006 amendment to the
FCMA requiring that specifics of any New England
ITQ program be approved by two-thirds of fishery
permit holders, a provision intended to ameliorate
industry consolidation away from owner–operators.
One sector has already been created with the express
intention of holding quotas for lease to other sectors,
and each sector risks elimination if it cannot marshal
considerable organizational and financial resources
to meet NOAA reporting requirements. In 2009,
NOAA expended about $30 million to support the
preparation of sector operations plans and
environmental assessments, but seems unlikely to
support administrative, monitoring, reporting, and
enforcement costs after the first year or few.
Although a few conservation-oriented sectors have
foundation funding, including those affiliated with
Penobscot East, Midcoast Fishermen’s Association,
and the Cape Cod Hook Fishermen’s Association,
others are governed almost exclusively by financial
interests. Many sectors have already defaulted to
voting mechanisms determined by landings history,
granting the most management power to permit
holders with the largest and least resourceconserving boats.
Although there is potential for involvement by state
or local governments as quota holders, it seems more
likely that sector-level decision making will be
increasingly vulnerable to influence from more
mobile capital and a few NGOs, and less
accountable to the broader public or to any
ecosystem-based vision. Although Penobscot East
and allies have asked repeatedly and without
success for restrictions on trawl gear, its efforts have
now been diverted to the securing and
administration of quotas. Evidence from the Cape
Cod hook fishermen and elsewhere in the northeast
demonstrates that members of sectors ostensibly
opposed to ITQs nonetheless position themselves
favorably for any future individual quota
distribution that might be implemented if more
cooperative efforts fail (Pinto da Silva and Kitts
2006). Similarly, since at the least the early 1990s,
Maine fishermen have observed that “what you
don’t use, you lose,” meaning that permits not used
to maximum capacity are likely to be rescinded.
Evidence from Alaskan harvest cooperatives, which
preceded and resemble New England sectors, shows
that although transaction costs and rent-seeking may

be lowered at the Council level, less transparent
political maneuvering at the cooperative level, and
even Congressional intervention, can narrow the
range of fishery beneficiaries, and can introduce
further rent-seeking around share allocations
(Criddle and Macinko 2000). Incentives have also
risen for other Maine fishermen to narrow their
scope of ecological concern. In the past, thousands
of lobster fishermen encountering groundfish that
entered their traps would take larger ones home to
eat, and release smaller ones with the expectation
of later harvesting them or their offspring. Virtually
all now spear the smaller ones as bait because they
have little hope of ever owning groundfish quotas
(Brewer 2010). In the words of one Council member
and mid-sized trawler owner who has long opposed
catch shares, countering the argument that common
conservation interests shared among sector
members will foster collective governance and selfenforcement around trip limits, “I can also tell you
from personal experience, there’s no spirit of
kumbaya here whatsoever. Nobody wants to share
anything. Matter of fact, they’d gut you and
eviscerate you and toss you in the harbor over a
hundred pounds of fish. So this whole idea of people
are going to sing kumbaya and manage this as a
community, I don’t know where that came from.”
(field audio recording and notes, 23 June 2010,
NEFMC meeting, Portland, Maine).
Fishing in a Brave New World
Catch shares have changed the way fishermen think
about fishing and fishery management. Field data
and archival review confirm that on several
occasions, the Council has been told by NOAA or
Council staff that their hard-fought regulatory
proposals would meet total catch targets based on
species population models, only to learn some
months later that the regulations required revision
because NOAA population estimates had been
revised with new data or modeling techniques;
because industry responses to regulatory or
ecological changes had altered landings, bycatch,
reporting, or compliance rates; or because a court
decision or ENGO action had raised the level of
legal risk. These experiences reinforce industry
skepticism about fisheries science and management
in general, but especially about the likelihood that
future catch share quotas will reward any present
conservation efforts. One patriarch of a multigenerational fishing family expressed a commonly
held sentiment, “These guys and their fuzzy math.
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They have these impossible equations that we’ll
never possibly reach. They are about control, not
conservation” (field interview, summer 2001, Port
Clyde, Maine).
Fishermen have learned that, under a catch share
system, individual species landings targets will
trump more ecologically oriented regulatory
proposals. Without confidence that species targets
alone will conserve fish populations, most now
invest their support in proposals that allow them to
catch as many fish as possible before they and their
family must leave the fishery forever, and/or will
allow them to sell a permit for as high a sum as
possible. They cynically negotiate for access to
paper fish, suppressing their own observations of
fish life histories, spatial patterns, and inter-species
and habitat interactions. For example, the perceived
illegitimacy of trip limits as conservation
mechanisms due to discarding, especially if paired
with higher ex-vessel prices for trip-limited species
due to low landings, spur some boats to intentionally
catch the maximum quantity allowed, instead of
avoiding that species. Many fear that not catching
the maximum limit could jeopardize future
individual allocations because days-at-sea are based
on catch histories, and individual quotas would
likely be allocated similarly (audio recording and
meeting summary, 29 November 2006, Portsmouth,
New Hampshire, NEFMC scoping meeting for
Multispecies Fishery Management Plan Amendment
16). In New Hampshire and Massachusetts, where
larger cod spawning aggregations can be harvested
closer to shore, some captains speak of catching
“my” or “our” cod, meaning the boat’s allotment or
quota for the trip, to which they now apparently feel
entitled. In the words of one high ranking NOAA
Fisheries regional staff member, “Sometimes a trip
limit becomes a goal instead of a constraint” (field
audio recording and notes, 23 June 2010, Portland,
Maine, NEFMC meeting).
Some lifelong opponents of ITQs who still hold
useable groundfish permits now express support for
ITQs as the last available option under the present
catch share constraints, finding the administrative
and political transaction costs of sectors to be too
high, and anticipating that the largest firms will
increasingly control sector administration and
decision making. For example, one part-owner of a
relatively large trawler spent some years fishing in
Alaska and always detested ITQs after seeing
excessive discards of small fish from boats wishing

to fill their quota with larger and higher value fish.
He privately supports basic tenets of area
management and gear restrictions, but cannot
endorse such proposals because he fears
implementation overlaid on already existing
regulations would put him out of business. Given
the catch share constraints within which he must
select a narrow range of regulatory options, he now
expresses public support for ITQs as the most viable
alternative, despite his continued ethical and
ecological concerns (pers. comm. 2005, Portland,
Maine; pers. comm., March 2010, Rockland,
Maine). His father and business partner, however,
still conveys that catch shares are “a travesty for
New England and a disaster for Maine!” (written
public comment on NOAA draft catch share policy,
2010).
DISCUSSION
Divergent Policies
In the case study presented here, even nascent sharebased fishery management mechanisms manifest
ecosystem drawbacks in line with the literature
summarized above on individual quota systems:
1. Fishing firms’ consideration of habitat and
inter-species variables, occupational ethics,
and regulatory compliance are dampened by
their limited faith in NOAA’s information
base and egalitarianism.
2. Fishing effort is consolidating away from
smaller boat harbors and shows tendencies
toward vertical integration and more mobile
capital.
3. Shares are allocated to permit holders with
large landings histories, eliminating diversified
and flexible boats that reduced groundfishing
effort when population depletions became
apparent.
4. Shares do not internalize ecosystem services
provided by habitat or inter-species
relationships, or ecological goods represented
by non-target species.
5. Aggregate catch targets based on the best
available science have not been sufficient for
widespread groundfish recovery.

Ecology and Society 16(1): 15
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art15/

6. Sectors seem likely to decrease transparency
and accountability by criteria other than catch
share totals, with governance mechanisms
being uncertain.
7. A sense of individual firm ownership or legal
right to access, already developed around
days-at-sea, is emerging around catch shares,
entrenching political haggling over paper fish
and discouraging thoughtful trade-offs
among ecological goods and services.

5. Area closures and other spatially explicit
considerations have thus far been trumped by
catch shares.
6. Trade-offs are often driven by least-common
denominators in the highly polarized Council
process, rarely by broad and thoughtful public
input.

Implications for Resilience
8. Any rent-seeking, market distortions,
information asymmetries, and path dependencies
arising at the sector level will be difficult to
discern or remedy because of reduced
transparency and public scrutiny.
It would be unfair to judge sector management
conclusively only a few months into implementation,
but we can consider the experiences of fleet quotas,
trip limits, and early indications of industry
transformation under sectors. Under these
mechanisms, little movement is visible toward
ecosystem-based management goals gleaned from
the existing literature, as summarized above:
1. The recovery of groundfish populations has
been slow, and habitat and non-target species
are not necessarily protected.
2. Total catch-focused management has not
been very responsive to industry information,
concerns, or conservation proposals and has
been slow to reverse species population
declines, suggesting limited capacity to
respond strategically to changes in
biophysical or social dimensions of the fished
ecosystem.
3. Scientific understanding of social variables
and the complexity of human–environment
relationships has not been formally
considered, even to the extent that
conversations about differential gear impacts
on habitat and species rarely take place.
4. Learning activities seem to be less focused on
accommodating ecological uncertainties than
on maximizing firms’ fishing access, or
anticipating the risk of legal action against
NOAA.

Conclusive evidence that catch shares do or do not
benefit targeted fish populations is not provided by
this nor other published studies, but this case does
demonstrate that possible social–ecological
drawbacks of catch shares merit further
consideration, both from management and scientific
perspectives. The question then becomes how to
launch such efforts. As noted by scholars of coupled
human–environment systems, resilience can be
facilitated by scientific attention to (1) links
between social and biophysical systems, (2) tradeoffs among ecosystem goods and services across
scales and prospective ecosystem states, and (3)
double-loop learning or adaptive organizational
models that permit operational changes in response
to new information (Argyris and Schön 1978,
Berkes and Folke 1998, Walker et al. 2006, Leslie
and Kinzig 2009).
In this vein, the Council brings considerable
personal familiarity with human–environment
systems, trade-offs, and flexible business
organizational models to the table. It does not
presently use scientific information derived from a
human–environment perspective, prospective tradeoffs, or social learning, however. Rather, the
Council relies primarily on target species population
assessments, as required by FCMA, supplemented
with limited information about habitat and social
and economic domains. These information streams
are rarely integrated or synthesized, discouraging
rigorous consideration of relationships among
biological, environmental, and social variables.
Social domains of social–ecological systems, like
ecological domains, exhibit path dependencies. If
resilient and ecosystem-based fishery management
approaches are to gain traction, considerable human
resources would be required for their thoughtful
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development. As discussed above, theoretical
groundwork has been laid by natural and social
scientists. Effective operationalization also requires
administrative expertise, local knowledge, and
more iterative and bidirectional exchanges between
scientific and practical perspectives, however.
Presently, New England fishermen, Council
members, and perhaps fisheries managers, are
administratively overextended coping with the
brave new world of catch shares. In this reactive
mode, they have no time to hone or advance
arguments for innovative alternatives. Even groups
formerly active on area management and gear
restrictions, such as the Northwest Atlantic Marine
Alliance and Penobscot East Resource Center, have
had to refocus staff time to sort out the
administrative requirements of, and political
retrenchments around, sector quota allocations.
Their financial, political, and human resource
investment in catch shares may preclude
opportunities to pursue more ecosystem-based
management options indefinitely. Institutional
memories are waning, as more recently hired staff
do not have the same familiarity with previous areaand gear-focused proposals. Similarly, fishermen
will likely become accustomed to sectors, as those
uncomfortable with sectors drop out of them, and
as firms favoring ITQs are likely to control some
sectors, so that interest in non-sector and non-ITQ
alternatives may diminish.

approaches. Although most public conversations
about marine spatial planning carefully sidestep
jurisdictional questions about relationships between
planning processes and the Fishery Management
Councils, many planning advocates implicitly
assume the Fishery Councils will ultimately answer
to newly empowered and overriding decision
bodies.
Because the Council system is widely perceived as
being so dysfunctional, we might stake some hope
on the possibility that the broader scope of marine
governance could reinvigorate science-decision
relationships around marine resource management
in a way that is more integrative and synthetic.
Given the inevitability of continued change in
marine systems, including climate-related changes,
the success of more comprehensive marine
governance will require rigorous empirical
understandings of social–ecological resilience and
adaptive capacity. If decision-support systems and
public participation processes are to be designed for
this purpose, we can hope that our cautionary tale
of Maine groundfish will be considered as an
example of how ecosystem perspectives were made
available to decision makers, but underused. As new
decision networks arise from the national ocean
policy and spatial planning initiative, we would be
wise to build in the provision of information on
human–environment links, ecosystem trade-offs,
and institutional adaptiveness that is sorely missing
in the groundfish case.

Pending Spatial Planning Opportunities
In light of the apparent disjuncture between catch
shares and ecosystem-based fishery management,
we can hope that a nascent federal framework for
spatial marine planning included in the Obama
Administration’s national ocean policy might
establish new venues for ecosystem-based thinking,
especially if the Administration thoroughly
operationalizes its stated intentions to incorporate
natural and social sciences, and public input
(Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force 2009). Placespecific collaboration across ecological, social
science, fishing, and policy perspectives could
stimulate considerable innovation in marine
resource management, perhaps focused on
empirically supported proposals for area-specific
gear restrictions. Impending climate-driven biooceanographic changes, and increasing scholarly
attention to how social–ecological variables interact
and manifest differently across spatial scales, also
encourage more adaptive and integrative

CONCLUSION
The groundfish case offers an opportunity to reflect
on the potentially conflictual relationship between
catch shares and ecosystem-based management. It
cannot argue that a majority of New England
fishermen explicitly endorse ecosystem-based
management. Indeed, most have never heard the
term, have no concrete idea about what it might
mean, or express concern that it sounds like a
conservationist crusade. Nonetheless, a majority of
fishermen have long been inclined to think about
fisheries management in ecological terms, and have
vehemently opposed catch shares partly for this
reason. Until the expansion of sectors as a pivotal
catch share management mechanism in New
England, an increasing number of fishermen in
Maine were actively supporting specific proposals
for ecosystem-oriented area management and gear
restrictions. These proposals were repeatedly

Ecology and Society 16(1): 15
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art15/

rejected by the New England Fishery Management
Council. Sectors have instead become the primary
Council focus, partly because of encouragement
from NOAA, as both the agency and major ENGOs
are promoting catch shares nationwide. With the
discourse thus shifted, groups formerly active in
support of area management and gear restrictions
now find their resources absorbed in trying to make
catch shares work, largely sidelining more
ecologically cognizant proposals.
If this apparent policy divergence is not ameliorated,
fishing interests will likely become more
consolidated and vertically integrated under mobile
capital, more politically entrenched, and more
oblivious to lessons of the social–ecological past.
From a short-term, purely monetary perspective,
strong groundfish populations paired with
continuing ecosystem decline under sector
management might not be undesirable for some
New England interests. Large mobile trawlers can
work offshore waters and land product in southern
New England ports, while small lobster boats
remain inshore and provide local jobs, at least for
the present. Loss of habitat, bio-economic diversity,
local knowledge, and ecological stewardship are
likely in this scenario, however, and are difficult to
reverse. We may find ourselves with a fisheries
management regime that is ostensibly successful in
single-species terms, but not resilient to the longer
term inevitability of environmental perturbations.
These policy challenges also play out in other North
American fisheries, but often with even less public
attention, perhaps due to their shorter post-colonial
histories and less iconic cultural status. Cursory
field data collection suggests that small-boat
fishermen fear loss of fishery access and ecosystem
impacts associated with industry consolidation
under catch shares in places such as Alaska (field
notes, 2 October 2006, Anchorage, Alaska, Alaska
Fishing Communities conference; pers. comm.,
April 2007, Homer, Alaska), British Columbia
(pers. comm., March 2004, Washington, D.C.; pers.
comm., 15 April 2009, Columbia, North Carolina),
California (pers. comm., January 2009, California),
Florida (pers. comm., 2004, Washington, D.C.),
North Carolina (pers. comm., 14 April, 2009, Duck,
North Carolina, Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management
Council meeting; pers. comm., 26 August 2009.
Hatteras, North Carolina, Hatteras Connection
meeting), New York (pers. comm., September
2005, Providence, Rhode Island, NEFMC

meeting,), Nova Scotia (field notes, 1999,
Rockland, Maine, Fishermen’s Forum; field notes,
2003, Stonington, Maine, Turning the Tide
meeting), and even the Ohio shores of Lake Erie
(field observation, October, 2006, Port Clinton,
Ohio). Similar observations are made by
practitioners and scholars working overseas,
especially those with an international development
orientation (Berkes et al. 2001). In those settings,
parallels with the experience of peasants and
smallholders in the Green Revolution, including
ecosystem impacts of consolidated land tenure, can
be drawn more readily. In the United States, by
contrast, although the implicit argument that catch
shares discourage ecosystem resilience has long
simmered within fishing communities, it has been
less articulated in management and policy venues.
Although many in the industry are certainly
responsible for any number of other resource
stewardship transgressions, this particular argument
surely merits more vigorous scientific and public
discussion. To miss such an opportunity is to erode
public confidence in the ability of government to
engage meaningfully with its diverse, if sometimes
disorganized and belligerent, constituencies. If
resource management is to be accountable and
resilient, it must seek avenues for mutual learning
among public, private, and non-governmental
groups. As Upton Sinclair wrote, “[i]t is difficult to
get a man to understand something, when his salary
depends upon his not understanding it!" (Sinclair
1935).
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art15/
responses/
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APPENDIX 1
Summary of fishing industry public comments on NOAA’s draft catch share policy
Table A1.1
Identifiable commercial fishermen and family members stating clear
opinions on catch shares, n = 64
Opposing catch shares
83%
Supporting catch shares
11%
Ambivalent
6%
Table A1.2
Identifiable recreational fishermen stating clear opinions on catch
shares, n = 83
Opposing catch shares
90%
Supporting catch shares
5%
Opposing recreational but supporting commercial catch shares 3%
Ambivalent
1%
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APPENDIX 2
Partial data summary
Table A2.1
Partial summary of extended in-person interviewees by location
(Excludes larger number of shorter, informal conversations.)
Principal base of operations, n = 166
Maine
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
North Carolina
Alaska
Elsewhere

Number of interviewees
140
1
8
2
5
5
5

Table A2.2
Partial summary of extended in-person interviewees by relationship to fishing industry
(Some interviewees fit more than one category. Excludes larger number of shorter, informal
conversations. Excludes normal professional conversations with academic colleagues.)
Relationship to industry, n = 166
Fisherman
Fishing family member, not primarily fisherman
Fishing dependent business, not primarily fishing
Non-profit organization
Government
Management advisory group
Scientist

Number of interviewees
122
8
12
13
10
25
6

Table A2.3
Partial list of public meetings attended
(Excludes private meetings, academic conferences, and site visits.)
Year
~1991
~1991
1999
1999
1999

Location
Portland, ME
Portland, ME
Machias, ME
Bar Harbor, ME
Stonington, ME

Purpose
NEFMC scoping meeting
NEFMC hearing
Maine DMR lobster zone meeting
Maine DMR lobster zone meeting
Maine DMR lobster zone meeting

Estimated time attended
2 hours
2 hours
2 hours
2 hours
2 hours
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1999
1999
1999
1999
2000
2001
~2001

Kennebunk, ME
York, ME
Rockland, ME
eastern ME
Rockland, ME
Rockland, ME
Portsmouth, NH

~2001 Rockland, ME
2002
2003
2003
2003
2003
~2003
~2003
~2003
2004
2004

Rockland, ME
Portland, ME
Portland, ME
Rockland, ME
Stonington, ME
Damariscotta, ME
Machias, ME
Wiscasset, ME
Rockland, ME
Washington, DC

2004
2004
2004
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2006
2006

Washington, DC
Washington, DC
Bristol, RI
Providence, RI
Portland, ME
Portland, ME
Revere, MA
Rockland, ME
Rockland, ME
North Shore, MA
Washington, DC
Portland, ME
Anchorage, AK

2009

Duck, NC

2009
2009
2010
2010
2010

Hatteras, NC
Columbia, NC
Rockland, ME
Stoning, ME
Portland, ME

Maine DMR lobster zone meeting
Maine DMR lobster zone meeting
Fishermen's Forum
Maine DMR urchin zone meeting
Fishermen's Forum
Fishermen's Forum
Northeast Consortium fisheries
collaborative research conference
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Commission meeting
Fishermen's Forum
NEFMC hearing
NEFMC scoping meeting
Fishermen's Forum
Turning the Tide workshop
Maine DMR scoping meeting
Maine DMR regulatory hearing
Maine DMR regulatory hearing
Fishermen's Forum
Congressional FCMA reauthorization
hearing
Congressional House Oceans Week
US and Pew Ocean Commissions briefing
Marine Law Symposium
NEFMC meeting
NEFMC meeting
NEFMC committee meeting
NEFMC committee meeting
Fishermen's Forum
Fleet Visioning workshop
Fleet Visioning workshop
Managing our Nation’s Fisheries conference
NEFMC meeting
Alaska Sea Grant Fishing Communities
conference
Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management
Council meeting
Hatteras Connection meeting
Environmental Defense workshop
Fishermen's Forum
Community Fisheries Action Roundtable
NEFMC meeting

2 hours
2 hours
3.5 days
3 hours
3.5 days
3.5 days
1 day
1 day
2 days
4 hours
2 hours
3.5 days
1 day
1 hour
3 hours
3 hours
2 days
2 hours
1 day
2 hours
2 days
3 days
2 days
1 day
1 day
2 days
3 hours
1 day
2 days
1 day
1 day
1 day
2 hours
2 hours
3.5 days
4 days
.5 day

